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ABSTRACT
In recent years, many developing countries have intervened in foreign exchange markets to offset to
some extent the effect on their economies of large capital flows.  Often, changes in reserve requirements
were used to mitigate the impact of that intervention on domestic money supplies.  Because reserve
requirements are a tax, however, changes in reserve requirements can have real effects.  This paper shows
that the exact implications for output, the real exchange rate, and the capital and current accounts depend
importantly on who--whether depositors or borrowers--pays the tax.  In any case, foreign exchange
intervention matched by changes in reserve requirements that keep the money supply fixed do influence
the exchange rate in the short and, sometimes, the long run.  The recent experiences of ten developing
countries establish that, while the incidence of the tax varies considerably across countries and time, both
deposit and lending rates of interest respond to changes in reserve requirements. 
JEL codes:  F310, F320, F410, E500.
Keywords:  Capital inflows; reserve requirements; intervention.  1/  Discussions of this issue include Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1994 and 1996) and the papers in the special issue of the
International Journal of Finance and Economics devoted to international capital flows (July 1996).  
  2/  Indeed, to our knowledge, Argentina was the only country that experienced a surge in capital inflows in the early 1990s
and did not attempt to sterilize its foreign exchange intervention.
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I.  Introduction
The experience of the 1990s provides ample evidence that international capital flows can be both
sizable and changeable.  Mexico and Thailand are but two recent examples in a long list of countries that
have found that investors’ favor can sour quickly.  Given this history, it is not surprising that most of the
developing countries receiving sizable inflows this decade resisted, in varying degrees, the nominal
exchange rate appreciation that is typically associate with an increase in the demand for a country's assets. 
Policies aimed at offsetting the pressures on the currency to appreciate have included a variety of fiscal
austerity measures, liberalization of capital outflows, quantitative controls or taxes on capital inflows, and
an opening of commercial policy. 1/ 
Most countries have also resorted to sterilized intervention at one time or another.2/  This reliance
on sterilized intervention is at odds with the advice from theory.  It is a standard result in international
finance dating back to the Mundell-Fleming model of the early 1960s that, when assets are perfect
substitutes internationally, sterilized intervention has no real effects.  Sterilized open-market operations--the
simultaneous sale (purchase) of domestic currency on the foreign exchange market and the offsetting
purchase (sale) of domestic currency in the bond market--merely represents an exchange between the
central bank's holdings of foreign and domestic securities.  But when those assets are perfect substitutes,
such a transaction should not affect prices of financial assets (Mundell, 1963).
International economists have long struggled with the issue of whether this theoretical result holds
in practice.  Schadler et al., (1993) conclude that, in most of the developing countries that they examine,
there is some scope for sterilization policies in the short run--i.e., changes in domestic credit are not
instantly offset by changes in net foreign assets.  Frankel and Ok ungwu (1996), however, finds stronger  1/  Indeed, in most instances, reserve requirements are not remunerated.
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evidence of perfect capital mobility in many of the developing countries that have experienced heavy
capital inflows--casting greater doubt on any ability to influence exchange rates through sterilization.  
Another line of work has argued that even if assets were perfect substitutes, sterilized intervention
might serve an important role in signaling policy intentions.  In effect, foreign exchange intervention might
be viewed as the first step in a sequence of policy actions.  In pricing foreign exchange, market participants
would look past those essentially irrelevant operations to the changes in the domestic money stock that
they foreshadow, leading to an association between intervention and changes in currency value (Mussa,
1981).  The evidence on this issue is mixed:  Kaminsky and Lewis (1996) find little empirical support for
the signaling hypothesis in the United States, while Dominguez and Frankel (1993) do.  
Most of this literature, however, has neglected an important feature of the current practice of
sterilized intervention in many developing counties.  Central banks have tools to neutralize the effects on
the money stock of their foreign exchange operations beyond offsetting domestic open market
transactions.  Importantly, they can move past their own balance sheets:  The effect of the sale (purchase)
of domestic currency could be offset by raising (lowering) reserve requirements to keep the money stock
constant.  However, as long as domestic reserves do not pay a competitive interest rate, reserve
requirements are a tax on the banking system.1/  Changes in the tax can have real effects, including on the
exchange value of the currency.  Moreover, depending on the incidence of the reserve tax, domestic
spending and production may change as well.  
Determining the incidence of the reserve tax requires assessing the competitive position of the
depository sector.  We examine the two polar cases that appear in the banking literature, beginning with a
reserve tax that is borne by those bank customers who only have poor substitutes for banking products.  If
deposits are somewhat unique while borrowers have open access to market finance, then depositors will
pay the reserve tax in the form of below-market deposit rates of interest.  Second, we examine the case
where depositors have ready access to competing and equivalent market instruments while borrowers rely  1/  Most of the work on developing countries has focused on the use of reserve requirements as a form of financial
repression (see, for instance, McKinnon and Mathieson, 1981, and Brock, 1989).  In that vein, this paper shares some
similarities with Sussman's (1992) analysis of Israel's financial liberalization in the late 1970s.  Like what will follow,
Sussman emended Dornbusch's (1976) overshooting model.  Unlike this paper, Sussman does not provide a microeconomic
rationale for his assumed parameters representing financial repression.  Papazoglou and Karadeloglou (1997) offer a model
of exchange rate determination that explicitly includes a banking sector in which reserve requirements figure importantly. 
However, they do not consider alternative assumptions about the incidence of the reserve requirement tax or policy exercises
varying that reserve requirement.  On the real side of the economy, they assume that purchasing power parity holds.
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exclusively on banks.  Under these circumstances, the latter will pay the reserve tax in the form of above-
market loan rates of interest.
This heterogeneity among rates of return can have important macroeconomic consequences.  Even
if global financial trading enforces real interest parity across market interest rates (such as in the Treasury
market), there is room for central bank policy to affect deposit and loan rates if not all of the customers
have ready access to international capital markets.  Indeed, it could be argued that in many developing
countries capital market integration is asymmetric, with the liability side of bank balance sheets more
integrated than the asset side.  To draw this point formally and to trace the consequences for income,
prices, and the exchange rate, we extend Dornbusch's (1976) overshooting model.  No matter our
assumption about the incidence of the reserve tax, foreign exchange intervention paired with an offsetting
change in reserve requirements has an immediate impact on the real exchange rate.  Intuitively, if the
central bank, say, were to sell domestic currency and raise reserve requirements to keep the money stock
constant, it would also potentially make deposits less attractive (if depositors pay the reserve tax) or loans
more expensive (if borrowers pay the reserve tax).  In either case, the pair of policy actions would tend to
exert downward pressure on the value of the home currency on foreign exchange markets on impact. 
Thus, foreign exchange intervention can work, even if it does not affect the domestic money supply and
market assets are perfect substitutes.
While there has been some recent work on the impact of reserve requirements on economic activity
in industrial countries, notably Loungani and Rush (1995), much less has been done with regard to
developing countries.1/  As stressed by Dooley (1994), this has been a serious omission, both because the
range of policy variation in reserve requirements in developing countries has been large and because those  1/  In the cases where nonresident or foreign currency deposits were the main targets of the reserve requirement, the policy
is tantamount to a capital control (see Dooley, 1995, and Reinhart and Smith, 1995).
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economies typically rely more on their banking sectors, giving those institutions important scope to
exercise market power in deposit and loan pricing.  To help fill that gap in the literature, this paper
examines the experience of ten countries that have changed reserve requirements often in the past few
years.  The list of countries that have used changes in reserve requirements as a tool for sterilizing foreign
exchange intervention includes Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Czech Republic, Kenya, Malaysia,
Sri Lanka, Thailand, and, more recently in the wake of the December 1994 Mexican financial crisis,
Argentina.1/  
The next section briefly reviews the experiences of these developing countries that, when
confronted with heavy capital inflows over the past few years, have used reserve requirements to offset the
effects of their foreign exchange operations.  Section III provides a brief exposition of the incidence of the
reserve tax, while Section IV embeds that behavior into a fully specified macro-model.  In light of these
theoretical results, Section V examines the behavior of loan and deposit rates, as well as the evolution of
money multipliers, in the developing countries that have changed their reserve requirements.  Section VI
offers concluding comments.
II.  Some Background
Most of the literature on the use of reserve requirements in developing countries has focused on
their role as a source of revenue for the government and as a tax on the banking system (see, for instance,
McKinnon and Mathieson, 1981, and Brock, 1989).  This public finance perspective has been instructive
because, indeed, developing countries have tended to maintain higher reserve requirements than industrial
countries.  Brock (1989), for instance, finds evidence of a positive correlation in Africa and Latin America
between the level of reserve requirements and the inflation rate, suggesting high reserve requirements were
often used as a way of extracting a higher inflation tax.  More recently, McKinnon and Pill (1994) have
suggested that reserve requirements can play a useful role in mitigating some of the less desirable side-  1/  Dooley (1994) is a recent exception.
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effects associated with exchange-rate-based inflation stabilization plans (i.e., consumption booms and
"overborrowing").  However, relatively few studies on developing countries have focused on the frequent
use of reserve requirements as a tool of monetary control.1/  Yet, the experiences of many developing
countries during the 1990s highlights the importance of the use of reserve requirements in counter-cyclical
monetary policies. 
II. A.  Reserve requirements as a response to shifting capital flows
Faced with a surge in capital inflows during the early 1990s, many developing countries in Asia,
Latin America, Eastern Europe, and, to a lesser extent, Africa increased reserve requirements so as to
reduce the money multiplier and curtail the monetary expansion associated with central bank purchases of
foreign exchange (see Calvo, Leiderman, Reinhart, 1994 and 1996, Reinhart and Dunaway, 1996, and
Calvo, Sahay, and Végh, 1995).  Similarly, in the wake of the Mexican crisis of December 1994, some of
the countries that experienced sudden capital outflows (notably Argentina and Brazil) lowered reserve
requirements in an effort to inject some liquidity into the banking system at a time when foreign exchange
reserves were being lost and domestic interest rates were approaching unsustainably high levels.
The reserve-requirement measures carried out recently have taken a broad variety of forms.  Tables
1a and 1b document the considerable cross-country variation in the form and timing of these measures for
periods of capital inflow and Table 2 looks at more recent episodes of outflows.  Some countries have
opted simply to increase the statutory reserve requirements in all or some categories of domestic currency
deposits.  Leading examples of this policy are Brazil, Costa Rica, Kenya, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka.  Other
countries, such as Brazil and Colombia, imposed high marginal reserve requirements.  In several countries
where banks offer foreign currency deposits--including Chile, and Sri Lanka--reserve requirements on these
accounts were either imposed for the first time or increased.  While this latter measure does not affect the
narrow money multiplier, it does reduce the expansion in the broader aggregates, which include foreign
currency deposits.  In some instances the eligible liability base subject to reserve requirements was  1/  See Schadler, et. al. (1993).
  2/  Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod (1994).
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expanded (Brazil, Chile, Malaysia, and Thailand) by including previously exempt transactions (such as some
types of loans) or some categories of deposits (such as nonresident deposits).  In other instances, efforts
were undertaken to strengthen the compliance with existing reserve requirements (Egypt).1/
Often, however, reserve requirement increases were complemented by other liquidity-absorbing
measures, such as open market sales of Treasury bills or central bank paper and the shifting of government
deposits from the banking system to the central bank (see Reinhart and Dunaway, 1995).  Hence, in some
instances it is difficult to isolate empirically the effects on interest rates and deposit-lending interest rate
spreads of the increase in reserve requirements.
II. B.  The dominant role of banks in developing country finance
As the next sections show, determining the incidence of the reserve tax requires assessing the
competitive position of the depository sector.  A reserve tax is borne by those bank customers who only
have poor substitutes for banking products.  In many developing countries, both depositors and borrowers
have limited options outside the banking system.  As noted by Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod (1994) in their
analysis of the financial structure of Latin American countries, banks played a central role in providing
short-term financing during the 1980s.  Even in the early 1990s, despite a rapid expansion in other sources
of finance (notably international placements of bonds and equity), bank loans remained the most important
source of finance for the private sector.2/
As late as 1992, in eight of the eleven Latin American countries examined by Rojas-Suarez and
Weisbrod, commercial banks accounted for more than three-quarters of the stock of net credit to the
private sector.  This differs markedly from patterns observed in most industrial countries, where bank
finance competes with other sources of financing, such as issuance of bonds, equities, and commercial
paper.  By way of illustration, Table 3 compares the composition of financing in Chile, Germany, and the
United States.  At one end of the spectrum is the United States, where bank loans account for less than 12  1/  See, for instance, Singh and Hamid (1992).
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percent of corporate liabilities--at the other end is Chile, where banks account for three-fourths of
corporate financing.  For many other Latin American countries, that share is even higher.
In his analysis of the behavior of interest rates in selected Latin American countries, Rodriguez
(1994) points to evidence of highly segmented credit markets.  For countries that receive foreign currency
deposits (for example, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay), there is evidence of a two-tier loan
market.  The prime customers, which have access to international capital markets, tend to borrow in U.S.
dollars at interest rates that are comparable to those charged to AAA grade customers.  Small- and
medium-size enterprises, which may represent  higher credit risks (or higher information or transactions
costs), usually borrow in domestic currency at interest rates that are well above those warranted by
expected changes in the exchange rate. 
The heavy reliance on commercial banks, however, is not limited to Latin America alone, but, in
varying degrees, characterizes most developing countries.  When comparing firms' financing patterns in a
sample of developing countries from Africa, Asia, and Latin America to those in industrial countries,
recent studies suggest that developing countries are unique because of their corporate sector's
comparatively low reliance on internal sources of finance (i.e. retained earnings).1/  Firms in developing
countries rely more heavily on external (that is, to the firm) financing sources, with the bulk of that
financing done through banks.  While many developing countries saw a dramatic rise in international issues
of corporate bonds and equity during the early 1990s, this trend toward reduced reliance on bank financing
appears to be thus far limited to large, top-tier enterprises.
III.  The Incidence of the Reserve Tax
The conventional analysis of the effects of reserve requirements on bank behavior takes a public
finance approach by considering it a problem of calculating the incidence of a tax.  The requirement to
hold noninterest-bearing reserves in some proportion to deposits imposes a tax, which is passed through to
some extent to the firm's customers.  As an intermediary, a banking firm has customers on both sides of  1/  Double-entry bookkeeping makes this language somewhat arbitrary.  We described depositors as supplying funds and
borrowers as demanding funds.  We could as well have written about demands for deposits and supplies of loans.
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their balance sheets--borrowers and depositors.  Who pays the reserve tax depends on the structure of
those markets, both on the competition of other financial intermediaries with the banking system as a
whole and on the degree of competition within the banking system.  As will become clearer below, the first
margin--who competes with banks--determines whether depositors or borrowers pay the reserve tax.  The
second margin--how banks compete amongst themselves--determines the extent to which the reserve tax is
shared among the customers and owners of banks.
III. A.  When depositors pay
The standard approach to this issue (represented by Baltensperger, 1980, and Cagan, 1972)
examines the behavior of a depository exploiting its market power over the provision of deposits but acting
as a price taker in a national loan market.1/  As shown in the upper panel of Figure 1, this financial
intermediary faces an upward sloping supply-of-funds schedule, presumably because it has little local
competition for its deposits or because product differentiation has made its deposits somewhat unique. 
Taking account of this market power, the marginal cost associated with each additional unit of deposits
slopes more steeply upward and lies above that supply curve.
The intermediary uses those deposit funds to make loans at the national rate of i.  Because it is
small in that national market, the demand schedule for loans is horizontal at i.  Accordingly, the marginal
revenue of each additional loan coincides with this line.  The point of maximum profits for the bank, quite
intuitively, is where this constant marginal revenue equals the marginal cost of deposit funds, or point A in
the figure.  The rate paid on deposits corresponds to point B on the supply schedule directly below A. 
Profits equal the rectangle bounded by A, B, and the vertical axis.
In the lower panel of the figure, we consider the consequences of the imposition of reserve
requirements.  If this banking firm must set aside noninterest-bearing reserves on these deposits according
to a proportional reserve requirement of ô, each unit of lending (which earns i) is associated with ô
th of a  1/  This assumes that the bank held no reserves before the imposition of the reserve tax.  More likely, the bank held
reserves to meet customer clearing needs and to defend against runs (as in Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). In that case, the
marginal revenue schedule already embodied some added expense related to reserve holding.  It would only shift with the
imposition of reserve requirements to the extent that the tax was binding--that it required the bank to hold more reserves
than it would voluntarily do.
  2/  For example, under the assumptions already given, profits are written:
B = iL - dD.
For this intermediary, the imposition of a binding reserve requirement drives a wedge between loans and deposits, 
L=(1-J)D, so that profits are written:
B = [(1-J)i-d]D.
If deposit supply is written, D = Ad
", profits will be maximized when d = ["/(1+")](1-J)i.
  3/  In terms of the example in the previous footnote, assuming no market power is equivalent to making the coefficient "
(the elasticity of supply) arbitrarily large.  In that case, d = (1-J)i.
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unit of reserves (which has an opportunity cost of i).  Thus, the marginal revenue of lending falls from i to
(1-ô)i, seen in the figure as a shift down in the horizontal line.1/  With lower marginal revenue and
unchanged marginal costs, the bank reduces the scale of its intermediation and earns less profit (moving
from point A to D in the lower panel of the figure).  Intermediation through this bank has declined.  As is
standard in public finance, the incidence of the tax falls on the price--here the deposit rate--according to
the slope of the supply schedule.2/  Thus, bank depositors and owners share the burden of the reserve tax.
The same diagram can be used to explain tax incidence in the absence of market power, if the
supply-of-deposits curve were reinterpreted as applying to aggregate behavior.  The banking system as a
whole might face perfect competition in the market for loans, and no individual bank may be large enough
to have any power in the deposit market.  In that case, the market-equilibrium deposit rate is set at the
intersection of the supply schedule and the horizontal lending schedule (point C in the upper panel).  An
increase in the reserve requirement shifts the horizontal line down by ô, implying that the deposit rate is
reduced by a similar amount (seen as the move from points C to F).3/  If banks have no market power
individually and face stiff competition in the loan market, depositors pay the whole of the reserve tax.
III. B.  When borrowers pay
In 1985, Eugene Fama introduced an alternative paradigm for the incidence of the reserve tax. 
Fama (1985) noted that, in the United States, interest rates on large certificates of deposit usually equaled
those on commercial paper.  At that time, the former was subject to reserve requirements while the latter
was not.  To explain this, he reversed the assumptions about market power by considering a financial  1/  In this case, optimal lending volume determines the extent to which the bank taps the national deposit market, so that
profits are written:
B = [l - i/(1-J)]L
if loan volume is given by, L = B l
-$, then the optimal lending rate equals:
l = [$/($-1)][(1-J)]i
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intermediary confronted with a fixed cost of deposit funds, likely because its customers have alternative
investment choices that are perfect substitutes for the bank's deposit product.  As in the upper panel of
Figure 2, the average and marginal cost of funds would be constant at i, the national market rate.  This
bank, however, is assumed to have some market power in lending, perhaps because it has superior
information about its local market that enables it to ascertain risks better than its potential competitors.  In
that case, the demand for loans slopes down and the marginal revenue from lending slopes more sharply
down and lies below that curve.  The profit maximizing scale of lending takes place where marginal
revenue equals the constant cost of funds (point A) and loans are priced according to demand (point B).
If a reserve requirement is imposed, the bank cannot pass it through to its depositors because they
are footloose.  The cost of one unit of deposits, then, is the national market rate, i, plus the opportunity
cost of the idle reserve balances, iô.  That is, the reserve tax shifts up the horizontal deposit supply
schedule by ô, seen as the shift in the bottom panel of the figure.  The scale of intermediation declines,
along with profits, and
the loan rate rises (from points B to E in the upper panel of the figure).1/  The important conclusion from
Fama's work is that the reserve tax, in this case, is borne by borrowers and bank owners, not depositors.
Again, this diagram can be used to explain market equilibrium if banks individually had no market
power.  Banks as a whole may face a downward sloped demand for funds but compete away any monopoly
power among themselves.  In that case, equilibrium is determined at the intersection of that demand
schedule and the horizontal line representing the cost of funds.  The imposition of reserve requirements
shifts that horizontal line up by ô, which gets fully passed through to loan rates (seen as the move from  1/  Relative to the example in the previous footnote, competition makes $ (the sensitivity of loan demand) arbitrarily large. 
As a result, l = [1/(1-J)]i.
11
point C to F in the lower panel).  If the banking system faces perfect competition for deposit funds and
competes away any power in the loan market, then borrowers pay the reserve tax.1/
Experience in a particular country most likely lies somewhere between the two extremes presented
here.  The general message from these two examples is that the incidence of a reserve tax will fall on those
classes of assets or liabilities for which banks enjoy some market power.  It cannot fall on a market where
there are close substitutes for the services that banks provide, because those bank customers will simply
disappear.
IV.  Wider Consequences of Reserve Requirements
In this section, we weave together the two strands of our previous discussion.  Faced with capital
inflows, some central banks have intervened in the foreign exchange market, purchasing foreign currency
with their own currencies.  To prevent the changes in its balance sheet from affecting their domestic
monetary aggregates, they have often sterilized those interventions.  In many cases, these policy actions to
sterilize have included raising reserve requirements.  Our brief consideration of a simple banking model
suggests that a change in reserve requirements will be passed through in whole or in part to those markets-
-whether for deposits or loans--where banks have some monopoly power.  Thus, the broader consequences
of a reduction in the supply of money through an increase in reserve requirements depend importantly on
the incidence of that tax.
IV. A.  A simple macro model
We take a short-term focus, tracing the implications of a change in reserve requirements in a model
in which capital flows are not explicitly modeled, but expectations about the exchange rate enter and
monetary policy has potent, transitory real effects.  That is, we adapt the workhorse of the international12
ä ’ d & i;
ë ’ l & i,
literature--Dornbusch's (1976) overshooting model--to this issue, following fairly closely the version of that
model presented by Mussa (1984).
We assume that international arbitrage is enforced by the depository sector by virtue of their perfect
access to the world capital market.  Domestic banks can lend or borrow in foreign currency at the world
nominal interest rate of i
*.  The nominal return on the sole domestic market instrument, which is
denominated in the home currency, is denoted by i.  Domestic banks issue deposits bearing a nominal
return of d in home currency terms and make loans at the rate l in the home currency.  The spreads of
these rates to the comparable market rates are, 
and depend on the monopoly power of banks in each of those markets and the structure of reserve
requirements.  Modeling the incidence of the reserve tax, then, reduces to describing the extent to which
the two margins (ä,ë) vary as reserve requirements change.  We follow the simpler of the assumptions of
market structure that were examined in the previous section:  (i)  Banks compete amongst themselves
sufficiently that none can exploit monopoly power, and (ii) there exists a perfect substitute provided by a
nonbank intermediary for the products on one side of bank balance sheets.  The first assumption implies
that bank customers bear the reserve tax completely.  As for the second assumption, because there are two
sides to a balance sheet, we will have to consider two cases for the incidence of a reserve tax.
In case A, we assume that there is a perfect substitute for the banking system's loans, while in case
B we assume that there is a perfect substitute for the banking system's deposits.  To simplify the algebra,
define an indicator variable, E, that takes two values, 
E = 1 for case A and E = 0 for case B.  The equations for deposit and loan rates in both cases can be
expressed compactly as:  1/  Lower case nominal magnitudes are in logarithms.  Time subscripts will be suppressed unless absolutely necessary. 
This assumption of imperfect substitutability is one of the key differences of this model with that of Papzoglou and
Karadeloglou (1997). 
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ë ’ (1 & E)[ ô
(1&ô)
]i. (2)
è ’ s % p & p (. (3)
y ’ a1 & a2(l & ð) & a3è, where a2, a3 > 0 (4)
with corresponding spreads
As for the rest of the economy, there are two types of goods, which are imperfect substitutes in
consumption:  those produced domestically and priced at p and those produced abroad and priced at p
* in
terms of the foreign currency.1/  The exchange rate, s, is quoted as foreign currency per unit of domestic
currency so that the relative price of home goods (i.e., the real exchange rate) can be defined:
Note that equation (3) implies that an increase in è represents a real appreciation.
Aggregate expenditure, y, consists of real-interest- and relative-price-sensitive domestic demand and
net exports,
where l is the nominal lending rate and ð is the expected change in home goods prices.  The presence of a
lending, rather than a market, interest rate in the equation explaining aggregate demand is done to capture
the stylized fact described by Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod (1994):  In developing countries, firms rely on  1/  Calculating inflation in terms of an index that averages domestic and foreign prices does not materially alter the
discussion.  Similarly, it is a simple matter that does not affect the results to allow the possibility that some domestic
borrowers--presumably large firms--have access to the world capital market and can transact at i rather than l.
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ð ’ ÿ p( & ÿ s % b(y & y), where b > 0 (5)
ÿ è ’ b(y & y). (5')
m & p ’ h0 % h1d & h2i where h2 > h1 > 0. (6)
external finance, predominantly supplied by banks, to fund spending projects.1/  By including a loan rate
in aggregate demand, we are implicitly assuming that the effects of credit on the economy can be described
in terms of prices alone.  Thus, as in Bernanke and Blinder (1988), credit supply can be important even in
the absence of nonprice rationing.
Domestic goods prices respond sluggishly to excess demand, with the markup over foreign prices
written:
where a dot above the letter denotes the time derivative and an overscore represents the steady-state value
of a variable; thus, ¯ y is the economically-efficient long-run level of output.  Rearranging terms, we obtain a
relationship that explains the behavior of the real exchange rate over time,
Domestic investors choose among three types of assets:  the home money (which comprises
currency and local-currency-denominated deposits and is denoted m in logarithmic terms) and home and
foreign market instruments.  Foreigners do not hold domestic currency and the demand for money is
assumed to depend positively on the return to domestic deposits and negatively on the return on the
competing domestic asset:
Because the currency component of the monetary aggregate does not earn interest, it follows that h2 should
be greater than h1 to retain the familiar downward slope between real balances (which are defined as x = m-  1/  The results that follow still hold if money demand was allowed to depend positively on output.
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y ’ a1 & a2(r ( % ë & ÿ è) & a3è.
ÿ è ’ b
(1&a2b)
[a1& a2(r ( % ë) & a3è]. (9)
p) and the nominal market interest rate.1/ As for monetarypolicy, we assume that the central bank keeps
the nominal stock of money along a constant growth rate path of µ.
The cornerstone to the Dornbusch model holds that the domestic and foreign marketable
instruments are perfect substitutes so that, adjusted for any expected change in the exchange rate, they
provide the same return; assuming perfect foresight, this implies:
We assume that it is the actions of depositories that makes this so.  The arbitrage condition can be written
in a form that links real rates of return across countries, as in:
where r
* is the foreign real interest rate.  Thus, real interest parity obtains, as differing real rates of return
across countries compensate for expected changes in the real exchange rate.
Adding the loan rate-spread to both sides of the previous equation yields an explanation for the real
cost of capital at home that can be substituted into our behavioral explanation of expenditure, equation (4),
Note that we have two implicit explanations of the level of real output, from the spending relationship and
the Phillips' curve.  Equating these two explanations yields a differential equation explaining the change in
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This system is not closed, however, because ë may depend on the level of the nominal domestic market
rate, depending on who bears the reserve tax, as in equation (2).   The nominal rate itself, depends on the
level of real balances, which we can see by inverting the money demand equation (6), 
Substituting the explanations for the spread and the nominal rate into equation (9) we obtain a relationship
in the real exchange rate and real balances,
where:
As already explained, both ö and á must be negative to preserve a negatively sloped money demand
equation.  The standard assumption in this literature holds that ã is positive (as in Mussa, 1984), which we
maintain here.  Also note that both ö and á depend on the incidence of the reserve tax, E.
Equation (8) can be rearranged to explain domestic inflation, which implies that real balances
change according to:
This is an equation in two parameters, µ and r
*, and two behavioral relationships, è (which is
explained by equation (11)) and i (which is explained by equation 10).  Making 17


























a differential equation in the real exchange rate and real balances.
Equations (11) and (12) define a system in real balances, a continuous variable, and the real
exchange rate, a jump variable.  Putting those equations in more compact form, we have:
These equations determine two steady-state relationships between real balances and the real exchange rate,
but the parameters of those relationships depend on the reserve-incidence indicator, E.  However, note
that the determinant of the transition matrix equals ãa3ö, which is always negative, regardless of the
assumption about the incidence of the reserve tax.  Thus, this system always satisfies the saddlepath-
stability condition of having one positive and one negative characteristic root.  As a result, for any given
level of real balances, there is one level of real exchange rate that sets off a dynamic path toward the steady
state.  The determination of the steady state and exact dynamics about that steady state depends on who
pays the reserve tax.
IV. B.  When depositors pay
If the incidence of the reserve tax falls on depositors, then the indicator variable E equals 1 and the
parameter á equals 0.  As a result, the dynamic system given by equation (13) simplifies to:
As shown in Figure 3, the real exchange rate is only at rest at its long-run value of  --the   locus è ÿ è ’ 0
determines a unique long-run real exchange rate.  As a result, there is no scope for the growth rate of the18
nominal money stock or the specification of the demand for money (which only appears in the ÿ x=0 locus)
to influence the real exchange rate in the long run.  If depositors pay the reserve tax, a long-run, classical
dichotomy holds, and money is superneutral.  The ÿ x=0 locus slopes downward, because higher values of
real balances provide stimulus to spending that, to keep real balances unchanged, must be offset by an
appreciated real exchange rate.  The intersection of these two schedules determines the unique steady-state
solution to the model.
As suggested by the arrows in the figure, the unique, convergent transition path to the steady state--
the saddlepath--slopes downward, which is the essence of Dornbusch's overshooting result.  An increase in
the nominal stock of money raises the level of real balances on impact (as goods prices only adjust
gradually).  With real balances higher, the domestic nominal interest rate must be lower.  To satisfy the
interest-parity condition, this implies that the exchange rate--in real and nominal terms--must be expected
to appreciate over time.  However, because money is neutral, a once-off change in the nominal money
stock cannot affect the value of real variables in the long run.  Thus, the expected appreciation must
commence from a lower base level if the real exchange rate is to end unchanged.  That is, the nominal and
real exchange rate must depreciate on impact so that they can then appreciate gradually over time.  If an
event makes x larger than its steady-state value, market participants can choose a unique level for the real
exchange rate (one that is lower than its steady-state value because the saddlepath is negatively sloped)
consistent with perfect foresight and a stable return to the steady state.
The core exercise of this paper is to consider the impact of a permanent change in reserve
requirements, which is depicted in Figure 4.  Specifically, we consider an increase in domestic reserves in
the banking system--which would follow from the intervention purchase of foreign currencies on the
exchange market--matched perfectly by an increase in reserve requirements that leaves the nominal stock of
money constant.  That is, m and x are predetermined but ô rises.  1/  It is important to remember that reserve requirements might be raised for prudential reasons as well as to further macro
objectives (which is the topic of Dooley, 1996).  For instance, a central bank might raise J to induce disintermediation in
order to reduce distortions in the conomy related to an overreliance on deposit guarantees.  In this example, that policy aim is
achieved:  In the steady state, spending is unchanged but real balances are lower.  However, the model also suggests that




’ h1[h1(1&ô)&h2]&2 > 0
As already noted, monetary matters do not enter the   locus, so that it remains fixed at its ÿ è ’ 0
stead-state value.  Only the parameter ö, which is the inverse of the interest semi-elasticity of money
demand, changes by the amount, 
The parameter ö becomes less negative when ô rises, because when depositors pay a larger reserve tax, a
given change in market rates spurs a larger change in money demand than before. 
The parameter ö affects both the slope and the intercept of the ÿ x=0 locus.  An increase in reserve
requirements, as shown in Figure 4, flattens the ÿ x=0 line and shifts it to the left (as from the dashed to the
solid line).  The tilting down to the steady-state locus rotates the saddlepath down as well.  Essentially,
raising ô to keep the money supply unchanged lowers the demand for money by making deposits less
attractive.  With the nominal stock of money predetermined by its fixed-growth-rate rule, there has to be a
bit extra inflation (above µ) temporarily to erode the level of real balances.  The currency depreciates on
impact in recognition of that acceleration in domestic prices, generating excess demand through net
exports.  The spending boom is ephemeral, as real balances decline to their new lower steady-state level
and the real exchange rate appreciates back to its unchanged long-run level.  Even though marketable
assets are perfect substitutes internationally, the purchase of foreign currency offset by an increase in
reserve requirements puts downward pressure on the value of the currency in exchange markets, raises the
velocity of money in the long run, and has transitory effects on the real exchange rate and spending.1/ 
Likewise, a temporary increase in reserve requirements also results in an initial depreciation of the real
exchange rate followed by an eventual appreciation and return to the original equilibrium level.










If the incidence of the reserve tax falls on borrowers, then the indicator variable E equals 0.  No
simplification of the two-variable system defined in equation (13) is possible, although the parameters of
behavior that appears in those equations and that depend on E now reduce to:
The lack of any simplification in the dynamic system, itself, is a significant result:  The steady-state values
of real balances and the real exchange rate must be determined mutually, implying that this assumption of
the incidence of the reserve tax breaks down the classical dichotomy associated with the superneutrality of
money.  How real and nominal magnitudes interact depends on the properties of the two steady-state loci.
Inspection of the   locus, equation (13), shows that the classical dichotomy was lost ÿ è ’ 0
because the premium depositories charge on their loans enters directly into the determination of spending,
in the same manner as the world real rate.  The loan spread depends positively on the level of the domestic
nominal market interest rate.  If the nominal interest rate rises, then the loan rate spread widens and the
home currency must depreciate in the new steady state to attract net exports to replace the portion of
interest-sensitive spending that was choked off.  By the money-demand equation, the nominal rate is
negatively related to the level of real balances, so the   locus must slope up. ÿ è ’ 0
The slope of the ÿ x=0 locus, in contrast, is ambiguous, because the term M(ÿ x)/Mx can be either
negative or positive.  The upper panel of Figure 5 considers the case when that term is negative, which
holds when
Algebraically, the change in the real exchange rate differs from domestic inflation (or from the change in











wedge, in turn, can be explained by the interest parity condition.  To capture that difference, the nominal
interest rate is included in the ÿ x=0 equation--which is essentially all that makes the two steady-state loci in
equation (13) different. If ãa2 is relatively large, then any effect of changes in real balances on the nominal
rate (and therefore on s) is swamped by the effects on the real exchange rate--so that the ÿ x=0 locus slopes
up in the same manner as the   locus, although it is not as steep.  The dynamic arrows imply that ÿ è ’ 0
the transition path to the steady state slopes downward, preserving the overshooting of the real exchange
rate for any unanticipated change in real balances.  The lower panel of the figure examines the case when,
so that movements in the nominal rate bulk larger relative to è when real balances change.  As a result, the
ÿ x=0 locus slopes downward; here again, though, the saddlepath slopes downward and overshooting is
observed.
As shown in Figure 5, assumptions about the incidence of reserve requirements do not matter for
the general result that changes in real balances have potentially strong but transitory effects on the real
exchange rate.  Assumptions about the incidence of the reserve tax, however, have important consequences
on the determination of real and nominal magnitudes in the long run.  When borrowers pay the reserve tax,
changes in the growth rate of the nominal stock of money, which shift the ÿ x=0 locus, have an effect on the
steady-state real exchange rate because there is slope to the   locus.  That is, money is no longer ÿ è ’ 0
superneutral.
Figure 6 considers the impact of an increase in reserve requirements associated with an unchanged
stock of money.  Examining the two equations given by equation (13), it is straightforward to show that, at
an unchanged level of real balances, both the ÿ x=0 and   loci shift by ÿ è ’ 0  1/   The formal model of fixed echange rates would follow Sussman (1992) by setting the expected change in the exchange
rate equal to zero and solving for the implied path of the stock of domestic money.
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in terms of è.  The ambiguity of the ÿ x=0 locus poses no problem for predictions about the effect of policy. 
An increase in ô shifts both schedules down in equals amounts, implying that the initial steady-state level of
real balances is consistent with a lower steady-state real exchange rate.  No dynamic adjustment is required-
-an increase in ô will be associated with an immediate step-down in the real exchange rate.  As before,
exchange-market intervention to support the foreign currency that is matched by an offsetting change in
reserve requirements will lower the value of the real exchange rate.  But when the incidence of the reserve
tax falls on borrowers, the effect is permanent.  A temporary increase in reserve requirements, when
borrowers pay, also results in an initial depreciation of the real exchange rate followed by a further
depreciation and an eventual reversal, as all variables return to the original equilibrium level.
IV. D.  Reserve requirement changes and fixed exchange rates
Thus far, the model and the discussion have focused exclusively in the case where the nominal
exchange rate is allowed to float freely.  However, many of the countries that have recently employed
countercyclical reserve requirement policies have either a fixed exchange rate or one that is heavily
managed.  Hence, it is useful to briefly discuss the effects on an increase in reserve requirements under
such an exchange rate arrangement.1/  
In a fixed exchange rate world, an increase in reserve requirements that exclusively alter deposit
rates of interest will have no real short-run or long-run effects on the real variables.  The increase in
deposit interest rates reduces the demand for money, inducing the central bank to sell foreign exchange
and buy domestic currency in order to keep the exchange rate fixed.  Simply, the decline in the demand for
money is accommodated by a reduced supply.
When borrowers pay, there are both short-run and long-run effects on output, the real exchange
rate, and the trade balance.  The increase in the real lending rate, tends to reduce output--now there is no
immediate offset from the real exchange rate--the adjustments to the real exchange rate are gradual, as23
these are effected through inflation.  As the output gap widens, inflation falls and the real exchange rate
depreciates to its new equilibrium level.  The current account improves.
V.  Some Evidence
This section examines the short-run behavior of deposit and lending rates of interest during more
than twenty episodes in ten countries in which reserve requirements were adjusted as part of the
macroeconomic policy response to large shifts in international capital flows.  As the previous sections
highlights, the macroeconomic effects of the reserve policy depend importantly on who pays the reserve
tax.  Furthermore, it can be expected that the macroeconomic effects of the policy also depend crucially on
its effectiveness in collecting the reserve tax.  If the reserve tax is easily circumvented through
disintermediation and the establishment or growth of nonbank financial institutions, then the
macroeconomic consequences of the reserve policy are likely to be limited.  In that case, the effect of the
change in reserve requirement on the money multiplier, particularly for a broader measure of money, is also
bound to be small.  In turn, if the growth of the monetary and credit aggregates is largely unaffected, then
there is little reason to expect that economic activity, the real exchange rate, and the external accounts will
be affected by the change in reserve requirement.  Reserve requirement changes would be as ineffective as
sterilized intervention under the usual assumption about perfect asset substitutability.  To assess this issue,
we examine the behavior of the money multipliers around the time of the change in the reserve
requirement. 
V. A. Interest rates and changes in reserve requirements
During most of the 1990s, all the countries in our sample experienced a surge in capital inflows and
accumulated foreign exchange reserves.  Hence, most of the episodes examined (20 out of 25) involve
increasing reserve requirements to mop up the liquidity created by central bank purchases of foreign
exchange.  Tables 4a and 4b document the evolution of key deposit and lending rates of interest, as well as
spreads, around the time of the changes in reserve requirements chronicled in Tables 1a and 1b.  Monthly
data are used to trace out the path of each variable from the month prior to the increase in reserve  1/  Interest rates are monthly averages of daily rates.
  2/  Further, in a number of additional instances nominal lending rates did not rise because there were marked declines in
the inflation rate at the time of the change in the reserve requirement.
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requirements (labeled t-1 in the tables) until two months following the event.  Several qualifications should
be stressed before interpreting these figures.  First, in some instances, interest rates do not respond
contemporaneously to the change in reserve requirements and adjustments are not evident until the
following month (t+1).  This need not reflect a sluggish adjustment on the part of banks but may simply be
due to the timing of the change in reserve requirements, which may occur late in the month.1/  Second,
care is needed in interpreting the changes in individual interest rates.  For example, on July 1, 1994 Brazil
introduced substantive increases in reserve requirements while at the same time nominal lending rates fell
sharply.  On the surface this behavior appears inconsistent with profit maximizing banks.  However, the
decline in lending rates was entirely due to the abrupt decline in inflation associated with the
implementation of the third phase of the "real" plan.  Indeed, in this episode, the decline in deposit rates
was even larger and the lending-deposit rate spread widened noticeably (Table 4b).  Third, other factors
that directly affect nominal interest rates, such as exchange rate and fiscal policy or foreign interest rates,
were not constant as the changes in reserve requirements were implemented.  Similarly, the decline in
deposit rates of interest in Malaysia in January 1994 need not be entirely attributable to the reserve
requirement change--capital controls, which barred domestic residents from selling short-term assets to
foreigners, were also introduced at that time.
With these caveats in mind, the data presented in Tables 4a and 4b reveal two important
regularities.  First, in nearly all cases (17 out of the 20), deposit-to-lending interest rate spreads widen on
the wake of an increase in reserve requirements.  Second, both depositors and borrowers pay the tax; in 14
episodes deposit rates of interest fell on the month of the change in reserve requirements or in the
following month.  In 12 of the episodes lending rates rose; in about one half of the cases both interest rates
adjusted in a way predicted by theory.2/  Further, in  some cases where lending rates did not fall in25
nominal terms at the time of the change in reserve requirements, inflation was also declining (Argentina,
1993 and Brazil, 1994 are examples of this phenomenon). 
V. B.  Money multipliers
Tracing the direct effects of changes in reserve requirements on macroeconomic variables is
complicated because changes in other policy variables (exchange rate, fiscal, and structural policies) and
exogenous factors (international interest rates and terms-of-trade) were also taking place.  One can be
certain that the transmission mechanism stressed in our theoretical model--through which monetary policy
affects output, the real exchange rate, and the current and capital account balances--would not be operative
if the reserve tax is circumvented.  Hence, a necessary condition for these macroeconomic effects to
materialize is that the "microeconomic" effects on interest rates and money multipliers are in place. 
Tables 5a and 5b show the evolution of the money multipliers around the time when required
reserves were changed.  In almost all instances, the narrow money multiplier fell on or in the month
following the change in reserve requirements.  The exception is Chile, where in both of the episodes where
reserve requirements on dollar deposits were raised, the broad money multiplier actually increases. 
However, this pattern need not suggest circumvention--it simply attests to the fact that, in Chile, dollar-
denominated deposits account for a small share of total bank deposits.  Declines in the broad money
multipliers were less common (13 out 17).  However, not all the decline in both narrow- and broad-money
multipliers need be exclusively attributed to increases in reserve requirements.  For instance, the marked
declines shown for Brazil in mid-1994 are not likely to be entirely attributable to the hike in reserve
requirements, as an abrupt decline in inflation (such as the one that takes place at that time) is likely to
increase the public's demand for currency
--a factor that also reduces the multiplier.  However, taken together, the evidence presented on Tables 5a
and 5b suggests that policy was effective, at least in the short run, in curbing the monetary expansion.
VI.  Conclusion  1/  Of course, the long-run fall in real balances when reserve requirements rise may be exactly the goal of a central bank
attempting to shrink bank balance sheets for prudential reasons.  A message from this paper is that this long-run outcome is
associated with transitory consequences for spending and the real exchange rate.
26
The wider consequences of a distortionary reserve requirements tax will depend on where it falls.  If
it only affects depositors, then the only real variable altered in the long run with a change in reserve
requirements is real balances.  However, all nominal magnitudes must adjust.  When prices are sticky, the
adjustment necessarily entails transitory real effects.1/  If the incidence of reserve requirements falls on
borrowers, then the real domestic loan rate in relation to the world real interest rate rises.  The real
exchange rate must depreciate to support spending.  Intuitively, the larger the proportion of borrowers
without access to world credit markets who must transact at the domestic loan rate, the greater is this
effect.
The perfect substitutability of market assets internationally does not pose an insuperable barrier to
exchange market intervention, as long as that policy action is paired with another policy action that has real
effects.  In the literature on signaling (as in Mussa, 1981, and Kaminsky and Lewis, 1994), sterilized foreign
exchange intervention that presages a realignment in domestic policy will have real effects.  In this paper,
foreign exchange intervention that triggers a concurrent tax change--a change in the reserve tax--will have
real effects.  When central bankers pair the purchase (sale) of foreign currency with an increase (decrease)
in reserve requirements, they get the effect on the currency that they expected, although perhaps not for the
exact reasons that they had expected.
It is important to recognize that this model kept many dynamic aspects relevant to the discussion of
reserve requirements in the background.  Importantly, we implicitly held the distribution of capital in the
financial industry fixed.  Presumably, if some segment of the industry were disadvantaged by a tax, other
firms that are exempt from the tax will flourish.  Reserve requirements provide an incentive for the
creation of new tax-free instruments and encourage potential customers of banks to consider other
providers of financial services, including mutual funds, insurance companies, offshore financial27
institutions, and markets directly.  Particularly when there are fixed costs to forming customer-firm
relationships, business lost to the banking sector may be gone forever.
If such competitive matters concern policy makers, the distortionary effects of reserve requirements
would be eliminated if the central bank were allowed to pay a market-related interest rate on its reserves. 
But then any macroeconomic consequences owing to the uneven incidence of reserve requirements that
were considered in this paper would evaporate.
With regard to the evidence from developing countries that have used changes in reserve
requirements for the purpose of sterilizing foreign exchange intervention (i.e. increasing reserve
requirements when central bank purchases of foreign exchange are rising).  Several empirical regularities
emerge.  First, in nearly all cases considered deposit-lending interest rate spreads widen on the wake of an
increase in reserve requirements.  Secondly, both depositors and borrowers pay the tax; in 13 out of 20
episodes deposit rates of interest fell on the month of the change in reserve requirements or in the
following month, while in 12 of the episodes lending rates rose.  Third, in almost all instances both the
narrow and broad money multiplier fell on impact or in the month following the change in reserve
requirements.  Hence, the policy was effective, at least in the short run, in curbing the monetary expansion.
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387-402.Table 1a.  Changes in Reserve Requirements During Periods of Heavy Capital Inflows
1
Africa and Asia: 1989-1994
                                                                                                                                         
Kenya (1992)
October 1993-March 1994.  Statutory cash ratio is increased in three steps from 12 percent to 20 percent.
Malaysia (1989)
May 2, 1989.  Reserve requirement is increased to 4.5 percent from 3.5 percent for commercial banks and
3.0 percent for finance companies.
October 16, 1989.  Reserve requirement is increased from 4.5 to 5.5 percent.
January 16, 1990.  Reserve requirement is increased from 5.5 to 6.5 percent.
August 16, 1991.  Reserve requirement is increased form 6.5 to 7.5 percent.
September 16, 1991.  All outstanding ringgit received through swap transactions with non-residents, including
offshore banks, is to be included in the eligible liabilities base and be subject to the statutory reserve
requirements.
May 2, 1992.  Reserve requirement raised from 7.5 to 8.5 percent.  
January 3, 1994.  Reserve requirement increased from 8.5 to 9.5 percent.  The reserve requirement is extended
to cover foreign currency deposits and transactions (such as foreign currency borrowing from foreign
banking institutions and interbank borrowing).  Previously it had only applied to ringgit-denominated
transactions.
1994.  Reserve requirement increased in two steps to 11.5 percent.
Sri Lanka (1991)
November 1, 1991.  Reserve requirement on demand, time and saving deposits raised to 13 percent.
January 24, 1992.  Reserve requirement on demand, time and saving deposits raised to 14 percent. 
September 4, 1992.  Reserve requirement extended to include foreign currency deposits.
September 24, 1992.  Reserve requirement on demand, time and saving deposits lowered back to 13 percent.
January 29, 1993.  Reserve requirement on demand, time and saving deposits raised to 13.5 percent.
April 16, 1993.  Reserve requirement on demand, time and saving deposits raised to 14 percent.
May 21, 1993.  Reserve requirement on demand, time and saving deposits raised to 15 percent.
February, 1994.   Reserve requirement on foreign currency deposits which are invested abroad was reduced
to 5 percent.
Thailand (1988)
August 1, 1995.  Reserve requirements on non-resident domestic currency deposits were raised from zero to 7
percent.  These reserve requirements are nonrenumerated and must be deposited at the Bank of Thailand.
 
                                                                                                                                         
    1The date next to the
country name denotes the first year of the surge in inflows.
  Sources: Asea and Reinhart (1996); Aziz (1994); Bank Negara Malaysia Annual Report, various issues; Bank
of Thailand Quarterly Bulletin (1995); Hettiarachi and Herat (1994).    Table 1b.  Changes in Reserve Requirements During Periods of Heavy Capital Inflows
1
Eastern Europe and Latin America: 1990-1994
                                                                                                                                         
Argentina (1991)
August 15, 1993.  Reserve requirements on domestic and foreign currency demand deposits were raised from 40




August, 1994.  Reserve requirements were raised from 9 percent to 12 percent.
Brazil (1992)
July 1, 1994.  A 100 percent marginal reserve requirement on demand deposits and a 20 percent reserve
requirement on time deposits is introduced.  Reserve requirements on saving deposits are raised
from 10-15 percent to 20 percent.
August 31, 1994.  Reserve requirement on time and saving deposits are raised to 30 percent.
December 6, 1994. A 15 percent reserve requirement on loans for the purchases of goods is introduced.
Brazil (mid-April 1995)
April 28, 1995.  Reserve requirement on time deposits is raised back from 27 percent to 30 percent.  The
marginal reserve requirement on certificates of deposit is raised to 60 percent.  The reserve requirement
on loans is raised from 6 percent to 18 percent.
Chile (1990)
January 23, 1992.  Nonrenumerated 20 percent reserve requirement on deposits and loans in foreign currency
held by commercial banks.  The reserve requirement must be maintained for one year.
May 28, 1992.  Reserve requirement on foreign currency deposits and loans held by commercial banks is
increased to 30 percent.  The requirement was designed to make the tax rate fall as the maturity
increases.  A 30 percent marginal reserve requirement on interbank deposits is introduced.
Colombia (1991)
January 1991.  Marginal reserve requirement of 100 percent is imposed on all new deposits.  The reserves are
held as interest-bearing central bank bonds.
September 1991.  The marginal reserve requirement is replaced by an increase in reserve requirements on most
deposits.
Costa Rica (1991)
October 1992.  Reserve requirement on domestic currency demand deposits is raised from 30 to 34 percent, and
those on time deposits from 10 to 14 percent.
Mexico (1990)
April 1992.  A compulsory liquidity coefficient for dollar liabilities was set at 15 percent.  This coefficient must
be invested in liquid securities denominated in the same currency.
                                                                                                                                           
1The date next to the
country name denotes the first year of the surge in inflows.
  
2These increases in reserve requirements were intended to offset the liquidity increases associated with the
privatization of YPF.
  Sources:  Banco Central de Chile Memoria Anual and Evolucion de la Economia, various issues; Banco de la
Republica Colombia, Monthly Bulletin, various issues; Central Bank of Argentina; Gurria (1993); Calvo, Sahay,
and Végh (1995); and Rodriguez (1991). Table 2.  Changes in Reserve Requirements During Periods of Heavy Capital Outflows
December 1994-1995
                                                                                                                                         
Argentina
December 28, 1994.  In response to the outflow of deposits and resulting tightening of liquidity in the wake of
the Mexican crisis, reserve requirements on domestic and foreign currency demand and savings deposits
are lowered from 43 to 35 percent.  The measure is retroactive to December 16.
January 15, 1995.  Reserve requirements on domestic and foreign currency demand and savings deposits are
lowered from 35 to 30 percent, while reserve requirements on domestic currency 30-to-89 day time
deposits and foreign currency deposits with a maturities of less than a year are reduced from 3 percent to
1 percent.  The measures are announced as temporary, with the intention of reverting back to the pre-
December reserve requirements on February 1.
February 1, 1995.  Reserve requirements on domestic and foreign currency demand and savings deposits are
raised, not to the original 43 percent (as had been announced earlier), but to 32 percent.
March 1, 1995.  Reserve requirements on domestic and foreign currency demand and savings deposits are raised
from 32 to 33 percent.  Reserve requirements on domestic currency 30-to-89 day time deposits and
foreign currency deposits with maturities less than a year are increased from 1 to 2 percent.
August 1, 1995.  Reserve requirements on domestic and foreign currency demand and savings deposits are
lowered from 33 to 30 percent.  Reserve requirements on domestic currency 30-to-89 day time deposits
and foreign currency deposits with maturities of less than one year are eliminated and replaced by the
introduction of a liquidity requirement of 6 percent on 30-to-59 day time deposits and 2 percent for 60-to-
179 day time deposits.
  
Brazil
December 19, 1994.  Marginal reserve requirements were reduced from 100 percent to 90 percent.
January 1995.  Reserve requirement on time deposits were reduceed from 30 percent to 27 percent
                                                                                                                                         
  Source:  Central Bank of Argentina.34
Table 3. Corporate finance structurea: Chile, Germany and the USb  





       1980    76.0      -    22.0       2.0
       1985    86.0     3.0    11.0       0.0
       1990    75.0   11.0    14.0       0.0
Germany
      1980    60.7     1.5    13.3      24.5
      1985    55.4     1.4    20.7      22.5
      1990    55.9     1.9    19.5      22.7
US
      1980    12.2    15.7    49.3      49.3
      1985    11.8    16.1    48.6      48.6
      1990    11.9    17.1    47.1      47.1
a  As a percent of total financial liabilities outstanding.
B Only includes domestic sources of finance
C Includes commercial paper, loans from finance companies and government loans. Source: Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod
(1994)35
Table 4. Interest rates, spreads and increases in reserve requirementsa
Deposit rate, 1 month Base lending rate Spread Ratio of lending rate to
deposit rate
ASIA
Malaysiab  May 2, 1989
                     t-1 5.05 8.97 3.92 1.78
                     t 5.50 8.95 3.45 1.63
                     t+1 5.42 8.42 3.00 1.55
                     t+2 4.90 8.90 4.00 1.82
Malaysia October 19, 1989  
                     t-1 4.95 8.89 3.94 1.80
                     t 5.00 8.77 3.77 1.75
                     t+1 4.95 8.69 3.74 1.76
                     t+2 4.90 8.70 3.80 1.78
Malaysia January 16, 1990
                     t-1 4.90 8.70 3.80 1.78
                     t 5.02 8.65 3.63 1.72
                     t+1 4.90 8.70 3.80 1.78
                     t+2 5.35 8.64 3.29 1.61
Malaysia August 16, 1991 
                     t-1 7.00 9.30 2.30 1.33
                     t 7.25 9.43 2.18 1.30
                     t+1 7.50 9.16 1.66 1.22
                     t+2 7.50 9.65 2.15 1.29
Malaysia May 2, 1992
                     t-1 7.70 9.97 2.27 1.29
                     t 8.10 10.15 2.05 1.25
                     t+1 8.00 10.32 2.32 1.29
                     t+2 7.90 10.31 2.41 1.31
Malaysia January 3, 1994
                     t-1 6.40 9.65 3.25 1.51
                     t 6.20 9.44 3.24 1.52
                     t+1 6.00 9.36 3.36 1.56
                     t+2 5.80 9.25 3.45 1.5936




Spread Ratio of lending rate to
deposit rate
Sri Lankac Novermber 1, 1991
                     t-1 13.0 19.10 6.10 1.47
                     t 13.0 19.60 6.60 1.51
                     t+1 13.0 19.50 6.50 1.50
                     t+2 13.0 19.50 6.50 1.50
Sri Lanka January 24, 1992
                     t-1 13.0 19.60 6.60 1.51
                     t 13.0 19.50 6.50 1.50
                     t+1 13.0 19.50 6.50 1.50
                     t+2 13.0 19.40 6.40 1.49
Sri Lanka September, 1992d
                     t-1 13.0 19.90 6.90 1.53
                     t 13.0 19.90 6.90 1.53
                     t+1 13.0 20.0 7.00 1.54
                     t+2 13.0 20.20 7.20 1.55
Sri Lanka January 29, 1993
                     t-1 16.50 20.00 3.50 1.21
                     t 16.50 19.90 3.40 1.21
                     t+1 16.00
                     t+2 16.50
Sri Lanka April 16, 1993
                     t-1 16.50 19.90 3.40 1.21
                     t 16.50 19.90 3.40 1.21
                     t+1 16.50 20.00 3.50 1.21
                     t+2 16.10 20.20 4.10 1.25
Sri Lanka May 21, 1993
                     t-1 16.50 19.90 3.40 1.21
                     t 16.50 20.00 3.50 1.21
                     t+1 16.10 20.20 4.10 1.25
                     t+2 16.50 20.40 3.90 1.2437
Deposit rate in pesos Lending rate in pesos Spread Ratio of lending rate to
deposit rate
LATIN AMERICAe
Argentina August 15, 1993
                     t-1 11.01 11.94 0.93 1.08
                     t 10.01 9.93 -0.08 0.99
                     t+1 8.84 9.85 1.01 1.11
                     t+2 8.36 9.71 1.35 1.16
Deposit rate in US
dollars
Lending rate in US
dollars 
                     t-1 6.20 8.43 2.23 1.36
                     t 5.96 7.49 1.53 1.26
                     t+1 5.86 7.45 1.59 1.27
                     t+2 5.79 7.50 1.71 1.30
Savings deposit rate  Corporate lending rate
Brazil  July 1, 1994(monthly rates)
                     t-1 47.61 49.90 2.29 1.05
                     t 5.55 8.81 3.26 1.59
                     t+1 2.64 6.35 3.71 2.41
                     t+2 2.95 5.62 2.67 1.91
Brazil  April 28, 1994(montly rates)
                     t-1 2.81 6.62 3.81 2.36
                     t 3.95 7.05 3.10 1.78
                     t+1 3.76 7.16 3.40 1.90
                     t+2 3.40 6.99 3.59 2.06
US dollar deposit rate,
30-89 day
US dollar lending rate,
30-89 day
Chile  January 23, 1992
                     t-1 6.45 9.42 2.97 1.46
                     t 6.21 7.93 1.72 1.28
                     t+1 6.20 9.49 3.29 1.53
                     t+2 5.14 9.28 4.14 1.81
Chile May 28, 1992
                     t-1 5.00 9.18 4.18 1.84
                     t 5.15 9.25 4.10 1.80
                     t+1 5.17 8.34 3.17 1.6138
                     t+2 6.06 8.16 2.10 1.35
Deposit rate, 90 day CD Lending rate weighted
average
Colombia January 1991
                     t-1 38.15 46.40 8.25 1.22
                     t 34.56 47.19 12.63 1.37
                     t+1 34.16 46.00 11.84 1.35
                     t+2 36.66 45.88 9.22 1.25
Colombia September 1991
                     t-1 39.97 46.32 6.35 1.16
                     t 38.31 47.27 8.96 1.23
                     t+1 37.41 46.09 8.68 1.23
                     t+2 37.29 45.97 8.68 1.23
Deposit rate Lending rate
Costa Rica October 1992
                     t-1 15.50 25.73 10.23 1.66
                     t 16.50 26.73 10.23 1.62
                     t+1 16.50 28.04 11.54 1.70
                     t+2 16.50 28.21 10.96 1.64
Reductionsf in reserve requrirements Latin America
Argentina December 28, 1994
Deposit rate in pesos Lending rate in pesos
                     t-1 8.72 10.00 1.28 1.15
                     t 9.55 13.56 4.01 1.42
                     t+1 10.65 17.71 7.06 1.66
                     t+2 11.64 19.06 7.42 1.64
Deposit rate in US
dollars
Lending rate in US
dollars
                     t-1 5.82 8.33 2.51 1.43
                     t 6.14 9.80 3.66 1.60
                     t+1 6.54 11.34 4.80 1.73
                     t+2 6.88 12.11 5.23 1.76
Narrow money
multiplier
Broad money multiplier Credit to the private
sector (% change)
                     t-1 8.72 7.52 -1.20
                     t 9.55 13.98 4.43
                     t+1 10.65 12.59 1.9439
                     t+2 11.64 12.85 1.21
Savings deposit rate Corporate lending rate Spread
Brazil  December 19, 1994(monthly rates)
                     t-1 3.44 7.76 4.32 2.26
                     t 3.39 7.40 4.01 2.18
                     t+1 2.61 6.94 4.33 2.66
                     t+2 2.36 5.39 3.03 2.28
a The month in which the change in reserve requirement takes place is denoted by t.
B Sources:Bank Negara, Malaysia, Monthly Bulletin, various issues; IMF, International Financial Statistics
c Sources: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Monthly Bulletin, various issues; IMF, International Financial Statistics
d The net effect of the two measures resulted in an increase in reserve requirements.
E Sources: Banco Central de Chile, Monthly Bulletin, various issues; Banco de la Republica Colombia, Monthly Bulletin, various issues; Banco
Central do Brasil, Monthly Bulletin, various issues; Central Bank of Argentina; IMF, International Financial Statistics; SISBACEN
f Source: Banco Central do Brasil, Monthly Bulletin, various issues; Central Bank of Argentina, Monthly Bulletin, various issues; IMF,
International Financial Statistics; SISBACEN40
Table 5. Money multipliers, credit and increases in reserve requirementsa
Narrow money multiplier Broad  money multiplier  Credit to the private sectorb
(% change)
ASIA
             Malaysiac   May 2, 1989
                             t-1           1.54             4.92               0.60
                             t           1.47             4.62               0.40
                             t+1           1.48             4.63 2.40
                             t+2           1.50             4.65 0.50
            Malaysia  October 19,1989
                             t-1           1.52              4.77 1.50
                             t           1.44              4.50 1.50
                             t+1           1.48              4.65 4.00
                             t+2           1.49              4.68 1.70
           Malaysia January 16, 1990
                             t-1           1.49              4.69 1.70
                             t           1.36              4.03 1.40
                             t+1           1.46              4.47 0.60
                             t+2           1.43              4.45 0.70
           Malaysia August 16, 1991
                             t-1           1.42              4.44 2.10
                             t           1.35              4.24 1.20
                             t+1           1.37              4.26 2.90
                             t+2           1.33              4.26 1.00
           Malaysia May 2, 1992
                             t-1           1.33              4.36 -0.40
                             t           1.29              4.21 -0.80
                             t+1           1.30              4.30 -0.20
                             t+2           1.31              4.50 0.50
            Malaysia January 3, 1994
                             t-1            1.70              5.19 3.20
                             t           1.58             4.55 0.20
                             t+1           1.55             4.61 -1.50
                             t+2           1.52             4.84 0.80
                                                                                                                                                                                     (Continues)41
Narrow money multiplier Broad  money multiplier  Credit to the private sectorb
(% change)
AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA AND AVERAGE OF ALL EPISODES 
                      Kenya  October 1993
                             t-1            1.49            2.47 -0.60
                             t            1.27            2.49 3.00
                             t+1            1.35             2.42 0.80
                             t+2            1.24             2.62 2.30
                      Kenya March 1994
                             t-1            1.26             2.51 0.80
                             t            1.20             2.44 1.80
                             t+1            1.07             2.44 4.10
                             t+2            1.18             2.38 -3.40
                       Brazil  July 1, 1994
                             t-1            0.79              8.90 -2.00
                             t            0.69              6.13 -14.00
                             t+1            0.73              5.70 3.20
                             t+2            0.70              4.80 6.40
                     Chile  January 23, 1992
                             t-1            0.17              1.05 1.90
                             t            0.16              1.08 1.70
                             t+1            0.18              1.07 1.30
                             t+2            0.24              1.09 0.30  
                    Chile May 28, 1992
                             t-1            0.19              1.05 0.20
                             t            0.18               1.05 0.60
                             t+1            0.15               1.06 1.50
                             t+2            0.18               1.10 1.50
                     Average of all episodes
                             t-1            1.15               3.65 0.82
                             t            1.08               3.31 -0.27
                             t+1            1.09               3.33 1.74
                             t+2            1.08               3.31 1.12
a The month in which the change in reserve requirements takes place is denoted  by t.
B Deflated by the consumer price index.
C Sources: Bank Negara, Malaysia, Monthly Bulletin; Banco Central de Chile, Monthly Bulletin; IMF,
International Financial Statistics